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The ownership structure of a company has been identified as a key mechanism in 
corporate governance. The present study investigates the impact of ownership 
concentration and ownership identity on company economic performance. The sample 
consists of a unique database of 749 listed Continental European companies. The 
empirical results show that ownership concentration has a U-shaped relationship with 
firm performance. The effect of ownership concentration on corporate performance is 
also found to be negatively mediated by R&D investment and to vary across different 
legal settings. Furthermore, this research proposes and supports the hypothesis that the 
identity of the controlling shareholder has implications for corporate strategy and 
performance. In fact, corporate and state ownership have a positive and negative impact, 
respectively, on firm performance. Thus, the findings of this study suggest that ownership 
structure matters, particularly in a Continental European institutional setting. 
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The gap between ownership and control is a phenomenon that is at the heart of many large 
companies and precipitates conflicts of interest between principals (owners) and agents 
(managers). While principals are focused on enhancing the value of the firm, agents prefer 
to pursue their own short-term and financial interests (Berle & Means, 1932). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) described this divergence of interests as the agency theory. Corporate 
governance provides a guarantee to those that supply capital to a company that they will 
get a return on their investment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) and it can be described as the 
process by which investors attempt to minimize agency costs (Coase, 1937).  
Ownership structure is an important component of corporate governance (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986). The ownership structure of a firm is explained by ownership 
concentration, which provides quantitative data about the stake of the shareholder(s), and 
ownership identity, which provides qualitative data regarding the character of the 
shareholder(s). Concentrated and dispersed ownership can both lead to agency problems 
between different shareholders or stakeholders (Isik & Soykan, 2013) and different types 
of owners will differ in the objectives, risk preferences, and investment horizons they set 
for the firm, leading to dissimilar types of outcomes in terms of performance (Hautz et 
al., 2013). The controlling owner, defined as the largest shareholder, has the highest 
importance in the firm. Previous research argues that the controlling owner receives more 
attention from firm management and has access to more information than other 
shareholders (Useem, 1996; Schnatterly et al., 2008). Subsequently, the controlling owner 
may be in a privileged position to monitor, discipline and influence agents (Muller-Kahle, 
2013).  
R&D activities are very important to create a sustainable competitive advantage and 
enhance firm performance (Hall & Oriani, 2006). However, these can also be associated 
to agency costs. Even though R&D investments might result in higher performance, 
agents might tend to underinvest into R&D investments compared to principals, due to 
the high risk of failure and the long-term horizon associated with these investments 
(Holmström, 1989). Nonetheless, the literature has not gathered consensus whether 
controlling owners are long-term oriented and promote R&D investments (Chen, 2010). 
The relationship between ownership structure and economic performance has been one 
of the most widely researched areas in management (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). 
Regardless of the massive volume of empirical work available on this topic, scholars have 
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not reached an agreement, with different authors achieving inconsistent and even 
contradictory empirical evidence (Džanić, 2012). This research has considered mainly an 
Anglo-Saxon corporate governance structure (Gugler et al., 2008), which is not 
necessarily representative for continental Europe where the legal/institutional 
environment is quite different (Pedersen & Thomsen, 2003), corporate governance 
mechanisms are nearly non-existent in some countries (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), share 
ownership is much more concentrated (Isik & Soykan, 2013), and stock markets are less 
developed (Pedersen & Thomsen, 2003). Although recent studies have moved towards 
analyzing the relationship between ownership structure and performance in Europe 
(Lisboa & Esperança, 2008), they study Europe as a unit and therefore disregard regional 
specificities such as macroeconomic instability and investors legal protection (Thomsen 
& Perdersen, 2000). A meta-analysis by Wang and Shailer (2015) supports the need for 
comparative studies of the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance across countries with similar corporate governance environments.  
Thus, there are several research gaps on prior research concerning the ownership of 
corporations (Boyd & Solarino, 2016). This paper contributes to the literature by 
extending previous work to the different regions of continental Europe, allowing to 
compare the effect of ownership structure as a corporate governance mechanism within 
different institutional and legal settings. The results may boost the consistency and 
reliability of previous findings and provide information that can be used to achieve a more 
accurate definition of optimal ownership structure. Moreover, this research seeks to 
improve our understanding of how R&D investment mediates the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance, which is an aspect that was neglected by 
previous studies. Investigating the unknown impact of R&D investment may provide new 
insights to the existing literature. Furthermore, this study builds on the relatively limited 
literature on the impact of controlling ownership (Filatotchev & Wright, 2001; Muller-
Kahle, 2013). 
The objective of this study is to provide empirical evidence on whether and how corporate 
ownership structure influences the performance of European listed companies, focusing 
on the role and identity of the controlling shareholder. The research question for this study 
is as follows: What is the effect of ownership structure on the performance of European 
listed companies? Furthermore, it has been divided into four sub-questions: 1. How does 
ownership concentration influence the performance of European firms?  2. Does owner 
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identity impact the performance of European firms? 3. Does R&D investment mediate 
the interaction between ownership structure and firm performance? 4. Can differences 
across countries explain variation in performance? 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: chapter two discusses the theoretical 
foundations underpinning the present research and presents the hypothesis that will be 
tested in this study; chapter three describes the data sources and statistical methods used; 
chapter four reveals the research findings per hypothesis; chapter five discusses the results 
of this study by comparing it to previous literature, provides implications for academics, 
managers and policy makers, and discusses the limitations of the study; chapter six 


















2 Literature Review and Hypothesis 
The following chapter, which is divided into four sub-sections, aims to discuss the 
theoretical foundations supporting every hypothesis development. As a result, it: (i) 
provides a general overview of the corporate governance theory and the relevant literature 
within the field, to draw up the universe within which this research is constructed; (ii) 
elaborates on the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, 
supporting it with findings from empirical research; (iii) explores R&D investment in the 
context of the ownership literature; and (iv) elaborates on corporate governance 
differences across Continental European regions, supporting it with findings from 
previous studies. 
2.1 Corporate Governance Theory 
Corporate governance can be described as the various mechanisms that investors use to 
reduce agency costs (Coase, 1937). The existing literature considers that ownership 
structure is an important mechanism of corporate governance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
The lack of corporate governance systems in less developed capital markets increases the 
risk of managers not following the stakeholder approach, where they make decisions 
according to the interests of the firm’s stakeholders as a whole (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; 
Driver & Thompson, 2002). Corporate governance mechanisms are usually linked with 
the existence of agency costs, being essential to overcome potential principal-agent and 
principal-principal problems. 
2.1.1 Principal-Agent Theory 
Agency theory is the approach that is used more often when studying ownership issues 
(Boyd & Solarino, 2016). Berle and Means (1932) were the first to introduce the concept 
of agency theory, stating that the interests of firm’s managers often differ from the 
interests of the shareholders of the company. An agency cost occurs when there is a 
separation of ownership and management. In other words, agency theory states that the 
principal and the agent both want to maximize their utility and by doing so they will not 
act in the best interest for each other (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) define agency costs as the value lost by shareholders due to the divergent interests 
between principal and agent.  
To avoid the negative impact of agency costs on firm value, it is important to align 
principal and agent interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Nevertheless, due to the imperfect 
nature of contracts, it is impossible to develop a contract that accounts for every possible 
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action of an agent (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Nyberg et al., 2010). The absence of an 
alignment between both parties can lead to several adverse outcomes. For example, 
managers may favour strategic actions, such as mitigating risk, in order to increase their 
own financial rewards, potentially at the cost of shareholder return and the firm’s long-
term performance (Baumol, 1967; Boyd & Solarino, 2016). 
The two main types of principal-agent problems described in the literature are adverse 
selection and moral hazard. Whilst the first occurs ex ante writing the contract and arises 
due to hidden information, the latter exists ex post writing the contract and happens due 
to hidden action (Arrow, 1984). Adverse selection describes a situation where the 
principal is unable to observe the qualities of the agent in an accurate way (Furubotn & 
Richter, 2005). This asymmetry of information often leads to the principal, which has less 
information, to make bad decisions. On the other hand, the problem of moral hazard 
occurs because the principal is unable to completely evaluate the causes of the outcome 
of the agent’s actions, since these can be influenced by internal as well as external factors 
(Arrow, 1984; Jensen & Meckling, 1973). Consequently, this will lead to a situation 
where agents will act on their own incentives at the cost of the principal (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1973). 
2.1.2 Principal-Principal Theory 
The traditional agency model has led to the development of the principal-principal agency 
theory which explains the conflict between controlling owners and minority investors 
(Young et al., 2008). This theory states that in less developed capital markets principal-
principal conflicts may occur. These conflicts arise when the controlling owner 
emphasizes his own goals, expropriating value from minority shareholders. This results 
in the transfer of value from minority shareholders to the controlling shareholder (Morck 
et al., 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Thus, although controlling shareholders reduce 
the agency cost of managers, whether their presence is beneficial for companies depends 
on their expropriation behaviours (La Porta et al., 2000). According to Young et al. 
(2008), principal-principal conflicts are caused by concentrated ownership and control, 
weak legal protection of minority shareholders and inefficient corporate governance 
systems. 
2.2 Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance 
The effect of ownership structure, in terms of ownership concentration and ownership 
identity, on firm performance has been extensively researched in the literature. The 
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interconnection between ownership and management is an efficient substitute for costly 
corporate governance mechanisms (Schulze et al., 2002), reducing or even eliminating 
the existence of agency costs such as adverse selection and moral hazard. Nevertheless, 
presently most public companies have a concentrated ownership structure and are 
controlled by a dominant shareholder (La Porta et al., 1999), named as controlling 
shareholder. 
2.2.1 Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance  
Ownership concentration is defined as the number of shares owned by a firm’s 
shareholders and measures if these shares are widely or closely held by the listed 
companies (OECD, 1993; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Scholars have defined two 
conflicting paradigms in the literature: the alignment theory and the expropriation theory. 
Whilst the first states that ownership concentration has a positive influence on company 
performance, the latter defends the contrary effect. 
The alignment theory defends that controlling shareholders have more motivation to 
monitor the actions of managers, allowing the firm to achieve a better performance due 
to lower agency costs (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). When 
shareholders own a larger stake of the company’s stocks there are more incentives for 
them to control managers, since they could be more affected by the actions of these (Denis 
& McConnell, 2003). In other words, large shareholders achieve more benefits by staying 
informed than the cost, in terms of time and money, required to be able to obtain the 
information. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that large shareholders can improve firm 
performance by changing the strategy of the company or by negotiating with or replacing 
the management team. These authors state that managers maximize profits imperfectly 
and therefore large shareholders can find improvements that the incumbent management 
is not aware of. Moreover, ownership concentration can work as a substitute for weak 
legal and institutional environments, with a positive effect on firm performance (Wang & 
Shailer, 2015; Perotti & von Thadden, 2006). 
On the other hand, the expropriation theory argues that concentrated ownership may 
increase the probability of conflicts between large shareholders and minority shareholders 
(Denis & McConnell, 2003). Thus, controlling shareholders can act in their own interest 
and use their power to benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Naturally, pursuing the interests of the dominant shareholders 
may lead to worse firm performance, since interests of controlling shareholders and firm 
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interests may diverge (Leung & Horwitz, 2009). Additionally, concentrated ownership 
may imply lower performance due to less access to external finance and a negative impact 
on other corporate governance mechanisms, such as the board of directors (Wang & 
Shailer, 2015). 
Although many researches have tried to examine the impact of large shareholders, these 
have often found contradicting or mixed results (Al-Najjar, 2015), failing to shed light on 
to which extent ownership concentration pays off. In fact, some researchers do not find 
any impact at all of the ownership structure on firm performance (Demsetz & Villalonga, 
2001; Chen et al., 2005). These scholars defend that the optimal ownership structure 
highly depends on the environment the company is incorporated in (Becker, 1962). 
According to this viewpoint, companies that have an inefficient ownership structure will 
be eliminated by the market competition. 
Yet, many papers have found a positive relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm performance (Brailsford et al., 2002; Edwards & Weichenrieder, 2004). These 
results indicate that companies should increase stocks owned by dominant shareholders 
indefinitely. A less significant portion of studies, have found ownership concentration to 
be prejudicial for corporate performance (Dyck et al., 2004; Burkart et al., 1997; Pervan 
et al., 2012). This means that ownership concentration should be discouraged due to its 
detrimental impact on firm performance. More recently, there has been a focus on the 
possibility of a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance, suggesting that the two previous viewpoints might in fact complement each 
other. Studies concluded that at first there is an increasing effect of ownership 
concentration on firm performance and then a decreasing effect of ownership 
concentration on firm performance, documenting an inverted U-Shaped relationship 
(Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000; Liu et al., 2012; Arosa et al., 2010; Kapopoulos & 
Lazaretou, 2007). Thus, this stream of research argues that ownership concentration has 
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Table 1: Literature on Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance 
Although empirical results have diverged, as can be understood from the explanation 
above, there are two main theoretical predictions that give rise to a non-linear relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance. According to the alignment 
theory, concentrated ownership may minimize the agency problems that occur between 
controlling shareholders and the managers of the firm. Consequently, concentrated 
ownership may have a positive impact on firm performance due to the monitoring effect. 
On the other hand, the expropriation theory states that when ownership concentration 
exceeds a certain level, controlling shareholders may extract private benefits at the cost 
of other stakeholders, leading to a decrease in corporate performance. This said, it is 
expected that there is an increasing effect of ownership concentration on firm 
performance until a certain point and then a decreasing effect of ownership concentration 
on firm performance. 




H2: The share of ownership of the controlling shareholder has an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with firm performance. 
2.2.2 Owner Identity and Corporate Performance  
The identity of a firm’s owner is one of the most important factors affecting the strategy 
and performance of a company (Xia & Walker, 2015). Each type of owner has different 
incentives and consequently imposes different type of goals in terms of profit, dividends, 
capital structure, and growth rates (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Consequently, it is 
important, not only how much equity a shareholder owns, but also who that shareholder 
is. This thesis will focus on four owner identities: family, state, corporate, and 
institutional. These are among the main ownership types of publicly-traded companies 
around the world (Munari & Sobrero, 2010). 
2.2.2.1 Family Ownership 
Family firms are usually linked to a double role for the family as owners and managers 
of the firm (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Thus, families act on their own behalf and 
therefore they can pursue more focused strategies than other type of owners (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2010). The fact that families make large firm-specific investments in human 
capital (Maug, 1996) and invest a large proportion of their personal wealth in a single 
company (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010) leads to them being risk-averse and unwilling to 
give up control (Hautz et al., 2013).  
Claessens et al. (1999) documented high conflicts of interest between minority 
shareholders and controlling family, resulting in inferior company performance. These 
results suggest that families may attempt to expropriate minority shareholders. 
Nevertheless, most studies have found a positive association between family ownership 
and firm performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Wenyi, 2011; Chu, 2011; Boyd & 
Solarino, 2016). The in-depth knowledge that families have of the firm enables efficient 
monitoring, which in turn reduces the principal-agent problem. 
H3a: Family ownership has a positive impact on firm performance. 
2.2.2.2 State Ownership 
In many countries, especially in industries considered of public interest, the state owns 
some listed firms. The objective of state-owned corporations is less profit-oriented and 
more focused on maximizing social welfare (Shen & Lin, 2009). Hence, governments 
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may invest in private firms to achieve political, economic, or social goals (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1994; Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000), which are often associated with poor financial 
performance and low firm value (Hart et al., 1997). State-owned companies may benefit 
from some competitive advantages by having the government as their controlling 
shareholder, such as tax exemptions (Capobianco & Christiansen, 2011), easier access to 
credit (Tian & Estrin, 2008) or the creation of new regulations in favour of the firm 
(Borisova et al., 2012). Nonetheless, these benefits are overcome by the role these 
companies assume of correcting market failures (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). For 
example, the government may disregard profit in favour of reducing unemployment, 
extracting tax revenues, or contributing to the stability of the financial system (Borisova 
et al., 2012). The visibility of the social benefits pursued, which are highly dependent on 
regional differences, is critical to politicians (Shleifer & Vishny, 1996; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1994).  
Most of the empirical studies conclude that government ownership has a negative impact 
on performance (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2003; Dewenter & Malatesta, 1998; Goldeng et 
al., 2008). These results seem to indicate that the various competitive advantages these 
firms have could discourage monitoring, which in turn can trigger agency problems. This 
may happen because the monitoring costs are higher than the political payoff (Shen & 
Lin, 2009). 
H3b: State ownership has a negative impact on firm performance. 
2.2.2.3 Corporate Ownership 
Corporations may hold a large stake of shares in other companies as part of cross-
ownership or company group structures (Ghemmavat & Khanna, 1998; Kester, 1992). 
Although corporate ownership can provide access to valuable technology or capital that 
might improve the value of the allied companies (Kester, 1992), the target firm also loses 
some level of control and flexibility (Connelly et al., 2010).  
Previous research has not gathered consensus on whether the benefits of corporate 
ownership outweigh the costs associated (Demsetz, 1983). Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) 
found a negative relationship between corporate ownership and firm value, stating that 
corporate owners are more concerned with firm survival rather than shareholder value. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be more evidence that support a positive relationship 
between corporate ownership and firm value in continental European firms (Pedersen & 
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Thomsen, 2003; Connelly et al., 2010; Bauguess et al., 2009). In fact, this stream of 
research states that corporate ownership brings capital that can be used for growth, which 
in turn could lead to a better firm performance (Connelly et al., 2010).  
H3c: Corporate ownership has a positive impact on firm performance. 
2.2.2.4 Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership is defined as “the fraction of a firm’s shares that are held by 
institutional investors” (Chung & Zhang, 2011, p.250). Scholars have distinguished two 
categories of institutional investor: pressure resistant and pressure sensitive (Kochhar & 
David, 1996). The former (e.g. pension, hedge, and mutual funds) does not have any 
business relationship with the firm, whilst the latter (e.g. banks, and insurance companies) 
is constrained by regulatory requirements and subsequently has less ability to influence 
firms (Brickley et al., 1988; Boyd & Solarino, 2016). Institutional investors provide easy 
access to capital, have low risk aversion, are normally specialists in business, and are 
highly concerned with shareholder value, since their performance is often measured in 
terms of financial success (Pound, 1988; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Moreover, 
scholars have pointed out the informational and analytical advantages of institutional 
investors compared with other types of owners (Yuan et al., 2009). 
In general, researchers have found a positive impact of institutional ownership on firm 
performance (McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2003; Tuggle et al, 
2010). These findings have been associated to both categories of institutional investors, 
namely pressure resistant and pressure sensitive (Boyd & Solarino, 2016). These results 
indicate that institutional ownership may enhance firm performance through superior 
monitoring, since many fiduciary responsibilities are involved.  
Hypothesis 3d: Institutional ownership has a positive impact on firm performance. 
2.3 The Mediating Role of R&D 
R&D expenditures are investments in activities that contribute to product innovation, 
process innovation or the managing of innovations (Kastl et al., 2013). R&D investments 
have unique characteristics that make them different from other kind of investments 
(Singh & Faircloth, 2005). First, they are long-term investments, requiring a continuous 
input of human and financial resources (Munari et al., 2010). Second, R&D activities are 
specialized and can only be fully deployed in its original company (Williamson, 1988). 
Third, they are associated with high failure rates and can generate negative cash flows for 
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long periods (Munari et al., 2010). Surprisingly, there is very little empirical research on 
the interplay between ownership structure, R&D investments, and firm performance. In 
fact, this study is the first to empirically examine whether R&D plays a significant role 
in mediating the performance of a firm in relation to its ownership structure.  
According to agency theory, the corporate R&D strategy may result in principal-agent 
conflicts. Managers focus on short-term gains through efficiency-seeking investments 
and therefore may be reluctant to the long-term nature and high failure rate of R&D 
projects (Mansfield, 1968). On the other hand, high investment in R&D is generally 
attractive for shareholders since they forestall a positive effect on firm performance and 
they can reduce inherent risk by promoting a diversified investment portfolio (Hay & 
Morris, 1979). Ownership “represents a source of power that can be used either to support 
or oppose management, depending on how it is concentrated” (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1980, 
p.655). Consequently, ownership concentration has important strategic implications for 
R&D investments. In fact, since controlling shareholders have more power over 
management than minority shareholders (Cubbin & Leech, 1983), these have more 
incentives to monitor managers in order to guarantee that value-enhancing investments 
such as R&D are pursued. Accordingly, the general findings in the literature demonstrate 
that ownership concentration has a positive effect on R&D intensity (Cho, 1998; Hill & 
Snell, 1988; Barker & Mueller, 2002).  
The differences in the owner’s preferences, behaviours, and investment horizons lead to 
divergent effects on innovation development (Hoskisson et al., 2002; Munari & Sobrero, 
2010). Although the empirical findings from research confirmed the existence of a 
significant relationship between ownership identity and R&D investment, whether the 
impact is positive or negative is highly contingent on the institutional environment that 
affects the company. Institutional ownership is usually positively associated with R&D 
expenditure, although the effect is stronger for pressure resistant investors (Boyd & 
Solarino, 2016). This indicates that institutional investors assume a long-term perspective 
and are able to induce companies to be more innovative (Zahra, 1996; Aghion et al., 
2013). Mixed results have been yield for corporate ownership, with studies suggesting 
that this type of ownership can both increase or decrease the level of R&D investment 
(Domadenik et al., 2008; Allen & Phillips, 2000). The investment horizons and the desire 
to generate the public good of knowledge, favours the tendency of state-controlled firms 
to invest in R&D (Munari et al., 2010; Munari et al., 2002). Family-controlled firms are 
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generally associated with more conservative strategies in terms of R&D investment 
(Boyd & Solarino, 2016). This could be explained by the fact that families classically 
invest a significant amount of their own capital in the company and therefore leads to 
them becoming risk-averse (Rossi & Cebula, 2015)  
Scholars have thoroughly explored the relationship between R&D investments and firm 
performance and once again the results have been contradictory. Yet, the consensus seems 
to be that investment in R&D is vital for the survival and growth of firms, although this 
highly depends on the industry and market the firm is competing in (Lee & O’Neill, 
2003). Companies that invest in R&D activities can differentiate themselves from 
competitors, in terms of product innovation or even cost efficiency, which could result in 
more profits (Ting et al., 2016). Thus, several scholars have confirmed this intuition and 
demonstrated that R&D investments have a positive impact on firm performance (Lau, 
1998; Hill & Snell, 1988). 
H4a: R&D investment mediates the relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm performance. 
H4b: R&D investment mediates the relationship between ownership identity and firm 
performance. 
2.4 Variations Across Regions 
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance is dependent on the 
national institutions companies are embedded in (La Porta et al., 2002). This way, the 
efficiency of the ownership structure as a corporate governance mechanism, varies with 
the institutional structure at the country level (Young et al., 2008). The geographical 
position, the legal and regulatory system, industrial development, and cultural 
characteristics, along with other factors, influence the impact of ownership structure on 
firm performance (Pedersen & Thomsen, 1997). The legal protection of investors is the 
most important determinant of regional differences in ownership effects (La Porta et al., 
2000; Lisboa & Esperança, 2008). As mentioned previously, when there is a lack of 
investor protection, a conflict of interest occurs between the controlling shareholder and 
minority shareholders. This could lead to the controlling shareholder favouring private 
benefits over corporate performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
The ownership structure of a company could have a dissimilar impact on firm 
performance, depending on the legal system in place. The various regions of Continental 
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Europe have different dominant law systems. The French civil law is common across 
countries in Southern Europe (Lisboa & Esperança, 2008). In these nations, the quality 
of the legal rules is low and their enforcement is weak, leading to principal-principal 
conflicts (La Porta et al., 1998). Consequently, concentrated ownership is desired to avoid 
expropriations and to increase performance. On the other hand, the Scandinavian civil 
law is frequent across countries in Northern Europe (Lisboa & Esperança, 2008). These 
countries have a better quality of law enforcement and investors are better protected (La 
Porta et al., 1998). Thus, the concentration of ownership is not so important to enhance 
performance.  
H5: Ownership concentration contributes more to firm performance in Southern Europe 



















3 Methodology  
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methodology used to test the hypotheses 
previously formulated. Therefore, it specifies: (i) the research design adopted; (ii) the 
process of data collection and the sample drawn for this study; (iii) the variables used to 
measure financial performance, ownership structure and R&D investment; and (iv) the 
analytical strategy followed.  
3.1 Research Design  
This study makes use of quantitative data and methods to investigate the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance. According to Blumberg et al. (2014), 
research can be classified as formal or exploratory. This research can be classified as a 
formal study, because it aims to examine the effect of ownership structure on the 
performance of companies. As the focus of previous research has been on countries with 
an Anglo-Saxon corporate governance structure (Gugler et al., 2008), the geographical 
setting of this study is based on companies of Continental Europe. The time dimension 
analysed is constrained due to data availability, making this a cross-sectional study. 







Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
Source: Own Elaboration 
3.2 Data Source and Sample Selection Procedure 
To conduct this research, two secondary data sources were combined. This research uses 
the EFES database, an extensive database covering ownership data from 31 countries in 
Europe, and the Compustat Global database, which is an international database containing 
financial and market data. While the Compustat Global database is recognized among 
scholars as a credible and reliable source of information, the EFES database can also be 















Secondary data availability and constraints in each database contributed to define both 
the period and the sample size. The raw sample data consists of the 2500 largest European 
listed companies for which the EFES database provides ownership structure data. Given 
the context of this study, companies operating in the UK and Ireland were excluded. An 
overview of the counties included in this study can be found in Appendix I. In addition, 
data concerning total assets, total equity, net income (loss), employees, market value, 
R&D expenditures, and SIC codes were retrieved from Compustat Global. Firm 
performance data was collected for 2015 and used as the dependent variable. The data 
required for the independent variables, mediator, and control variables were collected for 
2014. Given this research design, it is unlikely that the measures for the non-independent 
variables, which were collected in the earlier period, are impacted by firm performance 
in the succeeding period (Muller-Kahle, 2013). Thus, reverse causality issues are less 
probable. Exceptionally, R&D expenditures are considered to be zero when reported as 
“missing” by Compustat. This assumption has been tested and used by previous scholars 
(Hirschey et al., 2012; Chauvin & Hirschey, 1993). Companies belonging to the sample 
are required to have full information over the sampling period for all the other variables. 
Therefore, the final sample consists of 749 companies from 29 different countries, 
complying with the following criteria: 
 Firms belonging to Continental Europe; 
 Firms with data available simultaneously on EFES and Compustat; 
 Firms whose data regarding the dependent variable is available for 2015 and data 
regarding the independent and control variables is available for 2016; 
 R&D expenditures data reported as “missing” was considered to be zero for all 
companies included in this study. 
3.3 Variables and Measures 
3.3.1 Dependent Variable 
Firm Performance 
Corporate financial performance can be measured using accounting-based measures and 
market-based measures (Al-Matari et al., 2014). These types of measures “focus on 
different aspects of performance” (McGuire et al., 1988, p.859). Accounting-based 
measures reflect the historical performance of the firm, being subject to bias from 
differences in accounting rules and therefore sensitive to manipulation (Krivogorsky, 
2006). On the other hand, market-based measures represent the investors’ expectations 
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concerning future performance rather than past performance (Al-Matari et al., 2014). The 
choice of a certain type of measure may affect empirical results (McGuire et al., 1988). 
Tobin’s Q, which is a market-based measure, is present in the essential academic literature 
concerning the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance (Morck 
et al., 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1995; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). This measure is 
a better performance indicator than return on assets (ROA) or return on equity (ROE), 
which are accounting-based measures (Morck et al., 1988; Cui & Mak, 2002). A Tobin’s 
Q above one indicates positive market expectations of the company’s current and future 
projects and their quality. On the other hand, results bellow one indicate moderate or 
negative expectations about the company’s plans (Cui & Mak, 2002; Lang et al., 1989). 
Thus, this study will rely on Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance. 
 
 
Figure 2: Firm Performance Measure 
Source: Own Elaboration 
3.3.2 Independent Variables 
Ownership Structure 
Several measures of ownership structure can be found in the literature. The two major 
dimensions of ownership structure are ownership concentration and ownership identity 
(Leech & Leahy, 1991). Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) state that the share and identity 
of the controlling owner is a good measure of ownership structure in European 
companies. This study uses the EFES database to assess these dimensions. 
Ownership concentration is measured by the stake of the controlling shareholder. This 
research defines a controlling shareholder as the single person holding, directly or 
indirectly, at least 25 percent of the capital or votes. This is consistent with previous 
literature, which refers this value as being the minimum stake necessary for a shareholder 
to have a significant influence on a company’s performance (Wiwattanakantang, 2001). 
Moreover, this study applies dummy variables to distinguish the four ownership 
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Figure 3: Ownership Structure Measures 
Source: Own Elaboration 
 
3.3.3 Mediator Variable 
R&D Investment 
This research uses R&D expenditures, which represents all costs that relate to a firm’s 
total annual expenditure in the development of new products or services, to measure R&D 
intensity. This choice is motivated by the ease and availability of data, as well as the 
acceptance among scholars (Munari et al., 2010; Filatotchev & Piesse, 2009). Companies 
with high R&D expenditures can have positive returns in the future and therefore increase 
their performance (Lau, 1998; Hill & Snell, 1988).  
3.3.4 Control Variables 
Firm Size 
The size of a company is a crucial factor to explain firm-specific heterogeneity. Studies 
suggest that larger firms have a lower risk of financial distress and achieve economies of 
scale and synergies. Thus, there is a positive relationship between firm size and firm 
performance (Claessens et al., 2002; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Pedersen & Thomsen, 
1999). This study will use the natural logarithm of the number of employees as a proxy 
variable for firm size (Beyer et al., 2011). 
Leverage 
The financial leverage of a company is calculated through dividing the current and non-
current liabilities by equity. Literature has found a positive connection between financial 
leverage and performance, because debtholders will assume a monitoring role, increasing 
the effectiveness of a firm’s management (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). 
Nevertheless, highly leveraged companies tend to cut R&D expenditure to cover their 





















Industry and Region 
Similar studies have demonstrated the importance of distinguishing different industries 
and nations (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000; Claessens et al., 2002). Firm performance tends 
to vary by industry, due to differences concerning the intensity of competition and 
importance of intangible assets (Pedersen & Thomsen, 2003). The SIC codes will be used 
to differentiate the different type of industries. In order to simplify the analysis, similar 
industries were merged together. Hence, five different industries were considered, 
namely: wholesale and retail, services, construction, primary sector and manufacturing. 
Besides, corporate performance may differ due to nation effects related to 
macroeconomic variables (Pedersen & Thomsen, 2003). Consequently, companies were 
allocated to four different Continental Europe regions: Northern Europe, Western Europe, 
Eastern Europe, and Southern Europe. 
Table 2 summarizes the variables and their codes, as described in the previous section. 
Variable Function Variable Name Variable Label Code Description 
Dependent Variable Tobin’s Q lnTobin 








Proportion of stocks 












Family, State, Institutional, 
Corporate 
0-1 dummies, where 
the reference category 
is Institutional 
Control Variables 
Firm Size lnSize 
Natural logarithm of 
the number of 
employees 
Financial Leverage Leverage 100 * (Debt/Equity) 
Industry 
Construction, Manufacturing, 
Primary Sector, Wholesale and 
Retail, Services 
0-1 dummies, where 
the reference category 
is Manufacturing 
Region 
Eastern, Northern, Southern and 
Western Europe 
0-1 dummies, where 
the reference category 
is Northern Europe 
Mediator Variable R&D Investment R&D 
All costs spent on 
R&D activities (mil. 
US $) 
Table 2: List of Variables and Codes 
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3.4 Analytical Strategy 
This study makes use of several different statistical procedures. Initially, univariate 
descriptive analysis and bivariate Pearson correlations were used to further explore the 
data. Furthermore, multivariate linear regressions (using the OLS method) were 
performed to understand the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance and Baron and Kenny’s (1986) mediation model was used to analyse if R&D 
investment mediates the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. 
Lastly, additional multivariate linear regressions were considered to understand if 
ownership concentration contributes more to firm performance across different regions. 
Having introduced the various methodologies and techniques this study makes use of, the 
economic specifications of each multivariate linear regression model needed to evaluate 
the proposed hypothesis will be further explained.  
Initially, one regression equation is used to analyse how the control variables are related 
with firm performance, as follows: 
Equation 1: lnTobini = 1 + β2 lnSizei+ β3 Leveragei+ β4 Easterni+ β5 Southerni + β6 Westerni  
+ β7 Constructioni + β8 PrimarySectori + β9 RetailandWholesalei + β10 Servicesi + ɛi , 
i=1,…,749 
where lnTobini stands for the logarithm of the Tobin’s Q Ratio; Leveragei refers to the 
Debt to Equity ratio of a given company; lnSizei is the logarithm of the number of 
employees of the company; Easterni, Southerni and Westerni are the dummy variables 
defining the region of Continental Europe of a certain company, with Northern European 
companies considered as the reference region category; Constuction, Primary Sector, 
Retail and Wholesale and Services are the dummy variables defining industry, being 
Manufacturing the reference category; ɛi  are the error terms associated with these 
regressions.  
Secondly, an extended version of the previous equation was tested, to search for 
evidence on H1, H2, H3a, H3b, H3c, and H3d. With the purpose of understanding the 
impact the stake held by the controlling owners has on firm performance and the link 
between the identity of the controlling owner and firm performance, this study estimates 
the following equation: 
Equation 2: lnTobin = 1+ β2 Stakei+ β3 Stakei
2+ β4 Corporatei+ β5 Familyi+ β6 Statei+ β7 
lnSizei+ β8 Leveragei+ β9 Easterni+ β10 Southerni + β11 Westerni +  β12 Constructioni + β13 
PrimarySectori + β14 RetailandWholesalei +  β15 Servicesi + ɛi , i=1,…,749 
25 
 
where Stakei, stands for the stake held by controlling owners and Stakei
2 is the square of 
the stake held by controlling owners; Corporatei, Familyi and Statei are dummy variables 
that stand for corporate, family and state ownership, respectively, leaving Institutional as 
the reference category. 
The mediation effects of R&D investment, which refers to H4a and H4b, is tested using 
Baron and Kenny’s (1986) mediation model. These authors refer three conditions for a 
variable to be considered a mediator. First, there needs to be a significant effect between 
the independent variable and the dependent variable. Second, the mediating variable 
needs to relate significantly to the dependent variable. Third, the mediating variable needs 
to relate significantly to the independent variable. The control variables were disregarded 
for both mediation models since this was the interpretation made of Baron and Kenny’s 
(1986) procedures. The conditions proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) were assessed 
using six additional regression analyses: 
Equation 3: R&Di = i1+ a Stakei+ ɛi , i=1,…,749 
Equation 4: lnTobin = i2+ c’ Stakei+ b R&Di + ɛi , i=1,…,749 
Equation 5: lnTobin = i3 + c Stakei+ ɛi , i=1,…,749 
Equation 6: R&Di = i1+ a1 Corporatei+ a2 Familyi+ a3 Statei+ ɛi , i=1,…,749 
Equation 7: lnTobin = i2+ c1’ Corporatei + c2’ Familyi+ + c3’ Statei+ b R&Di + ɛi,  i=1,…,749 
Equation 8: lnTobin = i3 + c1Corporatei+ + c2Familyi+ c3Statei + ɛi , i=1,…,749 
where R&Di represents all the costs that relate to the development of new products and 
services. 
To evaluate H5 and statistically compare the impact of ownership concentration on firm 
performance among different regions, the subsequent equation was formulated: 
Equation 9: lnTobini= 1+ 2 STAKENorthi + 3 STAKESouthi + β4 Corporatei+ β5 Familyi+ 
β6 Statei+ β7 lnSizei+ β8 Leveragei+ β9 Easterni+ β10 Southerni + β11 Westerni +  β12 
Constructioni + β13 PrimarySectori + β14 RetailandWholesalei +  β15 Servicesi +i  i=1,...,303 
where STAKENorthi and STAKESouthi are the ownership concentration in Northern 








4 Results  
This chapter explores the empirical results obtained. Therefore, it presents (i) descriptive 
statistics regarding the sampled companies; (ii) a validation of the statistical assumptions; 
and (iii) the correlations and regression analysis from the OLS regressions outlined above. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
4.1.1 Sample Characteristics 
The sample consists of 749 Continental European companies. The companies included in 
this study diverge in terms of region, identity, and industry (Appendix II). Western 
European firms represent the largest segment among the sample firms (43,3%), followed 
by Northern European (17,4%), Southern European (23,1%) and Eastern European 
(16,3%) companies. Furthermore, family ownership (36,4%) and corporate ownership 
(27,8%) are the predominant owner identities and manufacturing (40,7%) and services 
(43,8%) the most frequent industry among the firms studied.  
Descriptive statistics for all scale variables used in this analysis are presented in Table 3. 
As elaborated in the methodology section, firm performance is measured by Tobin’s Q. 
Tobin’s Q for firms included in the sample ranges from 0,22 to 11,28 with an average of 
1,31. Comparing the average of the firm performance indicators to findings in related 
studies shows that the sample is in line with prior research (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; 
Morck et al., 1988). Nevertheless, the slightly higher mean firm performance indicator 
that this study reveals can be explained due to the sample being characterized exclusively 
by companies with a stock capitalization of $200M or more, since this value influences 
the total market value of a company. On the other hand, the ownership concentration level 
of the firms studied is high. The mean of this variable is 52,93% with a standard deviation 
of 19,76%. Furthermore, the sample summary statistics reveal more interesting findings 
regarding the control variables considered. On average, the firms studied have 35.362 
employees and spent $64,56M on R&D expenditures during the year considered. The 
descriptives also reveal that the mean financial leverage is 245,67%, indicating that the 
companies considered have been heavily taking on debt and thus have high risk. 
Table 2 also shows that some of the variables are characterized by high skewness 
(measure of the asymmetry of the probability function) and kurtosis (measure of the 
“tailedness” of the probability function) values, indicating a non-normal distribution of 
these variables. This will be discussed further in chapter 4.1.2.  
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 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
Stake 749 ,00 100,00 52,9331 19,76397 ,240 ,089 -,468 ,178 
R&D 749 ,00 5874,00 64,5615 354,82673 10,836 ,089 141,378 ,178 
Tobin's Q 749 ,22 11,28 1,3073 ,97935 4,758 ,089 32,993 ,178 
Size 749 18 440809 13223,26 35361,988 6,743 ,089 57,814 ,178 
Leverage 749 -123,0000 73,0000 2,456668 7,6765745 -6,058 ,089 119,650 ,178 
lnSize 749 2,89 13,00 8,0949 1,72340 -,118 ,089 ,089 ,178 
lnTobin’s Q 749 -1,51 2,42 ,1199 ,49928 ,820 ,089 2,221 ,178 
Valid N  749         
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Scale Variables 
Table 4 shows the Pearson correlations, indicating the direction and strength of linear 
relationships between all variables included in this sample. The correlation matrix reveals 
that some of the variables are correlated with each other. Particularly, Leverage is 
correlated with lnTobin at 0,219 (p<0,01). There is a strong and significant negative 
correlation between Stake and R&D (p<0,05), suggesting that companies spend less in 
R&D expenditures when ownership is concentrated. The natural logarithm of firm size is 
negatively correlated with Leverage (p<0,01) and positively related with R&D (p<0,01). 
This indicates that larger firms rely less on debt and allocate more capital to R&D 
activities. Despite these correlations, multicollinearity should not be of concern, as 




4.1.2 Checking Statistical Assumptions 
To apply the analytical strategy mentioned previously, assumptions of the original sample 
data must be validated. These assumptions are those that are usually associated with 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix of the Scale Variables 
 lnTobin Stake Stakesq lnSize Leverage R&D 
lnTobin  1      
Stake  -,037 1     
Stakesq  -,037 ,978** 1    
lnSize  -,005 -,112** -,105** 1   
Leverage  ,219** ,025 ,023 -,232** 1  
R&D  ,017 -,115** -,098** ,272** -,025 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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regression models: normal distributed errors, collinearity, linearity of parameters, 
homoscedasticity and independence of errors (West, 2009). 
First, ensuring that the sample follows a normal distribution is important to achieve 
unbiased regression estimates. As illustrated in Table 3 the skewness and kurtosis of 
some variables indicate that these do not follow a normal distribution. To transform these 
variables to normality, Tobin’s Q has been subject to a logarithmic transformation, due 
to this variable being positively skewered, as suggested by Tabachinick and Fidell (2001). 
Additionally, since R&D and Leverage assume values that are negative or equal to zero, 
they have been deflated using a technique proposed by Field (2009). This author 
suggested to substitute the outlier by the value of the next highest/lowest observation, 
while adding/subtracting one unit. The descriptive statistics of the final deflated variables 
are shown on Table 5. 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of the Deflated Variables 
Further, multicollinearity occurs when two or more variables in a multiple regression 
model are highly correlated and therefore do not add explanatory power to the model 
(Brooks, 2008). Although some of the variables of this study are highly correlated, in an 
additional analysis by means of the variance inflation factor (VIF), none of these 
variables exceeds the limit VIF value of 10 which would indicate multicollinearity (Field, 
2009), as illustrated by Appendix III. Consequently, any existing multicollinearity 
poses minimal risk in the accuracy of the model estimates. 
Additional required assumptions to conduct multiple linear regressions are the 
independence of residuals and homoscedasticity. To back this up, the Modified White test 
as well as the Durbin Watson test were applied (Appendix IV). As the test-statistic of the 
Durbin Watson test was under the suggested d=2 for all models, there seems to be no 
autocorrelation. The assumption of homoscedasticity is further proven by a non-
significant result in the Modified White test, indicating that the standard errors are robust. 
This means that the standard deviations of the error terms are constant and independent. 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
R&D 749 ,00 1130,00 45,576 165,571 5,194 ,089 28,051 ,178 








4.2 Empirical Results 
The empirical regression results are presented in Table 6 and are discussed in the 
following. 
Table 6: Regression Results (DV = lnTobin) 
 Model 1 Model 2 








































































N Firms 749 749 
R2 0.239 0.258 
Adjusted R2 0.230 0.243 
 Standard errors in parentheses  






4.2.1 Control Variables and Firm Performance 
Model 1 includes the market-based firm performance indicator, lnTobin, as well as all 
control variables. The R2 of this model is 0.239, indicating that the variables in this model 
explain 23,9% of the variance in lnTobin. While the association between the indicator of 
firm performance and lnSize is non-significant (b=-0.012, p>0.10), firm performance is 
significantly negatively related to the firms’ leverage (b=-0.008, p<0.05). Compared to 
Northern European companies, the reference category for region, Eastern European 
companies showed a lower firm performance (b=-0.146, p<0.05). Differing, Southern and 
Western European companies showed a significantly higher firm performance indicated 
by lnTobin (Southern European companies: b=0.307, p<0.01; Western European 
companies: b=0.469, p<0.01). Results for the dummy coded industry variable showed that 
the investigated industries (construction, primary sector, retail and wholesale, and 
services) did not differ significantly from the reference category which is manufacturing.  
4.2.2 Ownership Structure and Firm Performance 
Model 2 explains the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance. The 
regression coefficient Stake is significant and negative for lnTobin (b=-0.008, p<0,1). 
Since this is a quadratic model, the regression coefficient of the variable Stake has no 
economic interpretation when isolated. The regression coefficient for the quadratic term 
Stakesq is positive and significant (c=0.00006, p<0,05). This result demonstrates that the 
share of the controlling shareholder has a U-shaped relationship with firm performance, 
unlike predicted by H2 (Appendix V). This indicates that when ownership concentration 
increases, on average, 1%, for an ownership concentration up to 62.54% Tobin´s Q 
decreases but for values above 62.54% it increases. Thus, this model does not provide 
support for H1 and H2, which are both rejected. 
This model also enters dummy coded variables related to ownership identity into the 
regression model. Family ownership has a positive but insignificant impact on Tobin’s Q 
(b1+bFamily=0,16). Thus, H3a is not supported. The association between state ownership 
and firm performance is negative and significant (b1+bState =-0,25; p<0,01). This finding 
provides evidence for H3b. Corporate ownership is positive and significantly associated 
to Tobin’s Q (b1+bCorporate=0,085; p<0,1), as assumed by H3c. Institutional ownership, 
which is the reference category for the identity variable, has no significant impact on firm 
performance, although this influence is positive, as predicted (b1=0,185; p<0,1). 
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Therefore, H3d is rejected. Based on these findings, this study concludes that a firm’s 
owner identity explains a significant variation in firm performance. 
4.2.3 Mediating role of R&D 
The mediating effect of R&D in the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance is investigated by computing a set of regression analyses, as suggested by 
Baron and Kenny (1986). In addition, this study uses an indirect mediation test (Preacher 
& Hayes, 2004). 
4.2.3.1 Ownership Concentration 
The mediation model presented in Figure 4 will be used to assess if R&D investment 





Figure 4: Mediation Model for H4a 
Source: Own Elaboration 
Results of the three regression models suggested by Baron and Kenny are presented in 
Table 7. There is a significant negative association between the independent variable 
Stake and the mediating variable R&D (a=-0.843, p<0.10). The relationship between the 
mediator and the dependent variable is also negative and significant (b=-0.0004, p<0.01). 
The total effect, which measures the impact of the independent variable Stake on lnTobin, 
revealed a significant positive relationship (c=0.001, p<0.05) and the overall indirect 
effect, which refers to the effect of R&D on lnTobin, demonstrated a significant 
association (b=-0.0004, p<0.01). Thus, this model meets the criteria for mediation (Baron 
and Kenny, 1986). 
Table 7: Results of the Mediation Analysis (H4a) 
 DV IV Regression Coefficient 
Model 3 











lnTobin Stake c=0.001400** 
(0.001) 
Standard errors in parentheses  












In addition, to test the true indirect effect, the output with the indirect mediation test, 
which provides the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval levels, will be assessed. The 
bootstrapping technique is a way to overcome some limitations that have been appointed 
to Baron and Kenny’s (1986) model. In this case, the bootstrapped confidence interval is 
from 0,000318 to 0,002465 (Appendix VI). Since this interval does not include the zero 
value, one can conclude that R&D mediates the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. The regression coefficients reveal that the stake of 
the controlling shareholder has a negative influence on R&D investment, which in turn 
has a negative effect on firm performance. Accordingly, H4a is supported. 
4.2.3.1 Ownership Identity 
To evaluate the mediating role of R&D investment in the relationship between ownership 
identity and firm performance another set of regression analyses were conducted. The 









Figure 5: Mediation Model for H4b 
Source: Own Elaboration 
The results of the regression analyses can be seen on Table 8. Initially, the association 
between the dummy-coded independent variable ownership identity and the mediating 
variable R&D was determined. State and institutional were the only ownership identities 
to have a significant impact on R&D. The regression model predicting firm performance 
by ownership identity reveals a significant and positive coefficient for family owned 
companies (c2= 0.126, p<0.05) and a significant and negative coefficient for state owned 
companies (c3=-0.167, p<0.01). Nevertheless, the indirect effect, which refers to the 
impact of R&D on lnTobin, was not significant. Consequently, this model does not meet 






















Table 8: Results of the Mediation Analysis (H4b) 
 DV IV Regression Coefficient 























































Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
4.2.4 Variations across Regions 
As illustrated by Table 9, the mean stake of controlling shareholders for Southern 
European companies is 56.22%, whilst this value is 43.29% for Northern European 
companies. Thus, the stake of controlling owners is higher in Southern European firms 
than in Northern European companies, as predicted previously. 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of Ownership Concentration by Region 
Region N Proportion (SD) 
Northern Europe 130 43.29 (18.86) 
Southern Europe 173 56.22 (17.10) 
N – Sample Size, SD – Standard Deviation 
There is a moderate correlation between lnTobin and the controlling shareholders stake 
in Northern and Southern European firms, as presented in Table 10. However, whilst this 
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correlation is positive in Southern European firms, it is negative for Northern European 
companies. 
Table 10: Correlation Matrix 
 lnTobin STAKENorth STAKESouth 
lnTobin  1   
STAKENorth  -0.279** 1  
STAKESouth  0.260** -0.787** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Results presented in Table 11 assesses H5, which predicted that ownership concentration 
contributes more to firm performance in Northern Europe than in Southern Europe. This 
hypothesis is supported as the results show that the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance is significant and negative in Northern European 
firms (b=-0.004, p<0.05) and significant but positive in Southern European companies. 
(b=0.002, p<0.01). In other words, the results demonstrate that an increasing Stake leads 
to a positive impact on lnTobin for firms in the south of Europe, whilst the contrary occurs 
for companies in the north of Europe. 
Table 11: Regression Results (DV =lnTobin) 
Variables 
Unstandardized 















































Standard errors in parentheses  





This chapter attempts to understand whether and how corporate ownership structure 
influences the financial performance of European listed companies. Therefore, it (i) 
explores the empirical results obtained in the previous section further and compares them 
with the published data; (ii) describes the main implications of this study; and (iii) 
acknowledges limitations and provides direction for future research. 
5.1 Discussion of Empirical Findings 
The results of this study differ from those obtained by Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), 
who found an inverted U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and 
performance in European companies. According to these authors, ownership 
concentration is expected to have a positive impact on firm performance up to a certain 
level, after which the positive impact turns into a negative one. Their results were 
coherent with the alignment theory, which states that ownership concentration increases 
the incentives for shareholders to monitor managers, and with the expropriation theory, 
according to which when large shareholders become too powerful, it could lead to them 
extracting private benefits by expropriating the minority shareholders.  
The estimation results are not in line with the prediction of the agency theory. In fact, 
contrary to expected, this paper reports a significant U-shaped association between 
ownership concentration and firm performance. Consequently, this association indicates 
that for a share of capital held by the controlling shareholder, up to 62,54% firm 
performance decreases, but for values above 62,54%, it increases, which indicates that 
low as well as high levels of ownership are the most beneficial for the corporate 
performance of a company. An explanation for this quadratic relationship could be that 
intermediate levels of control reduce the possibility of a takeover and entrench bad 
managers (Barclay & Holderness, 1989). This finding is very interesting, and previous 
literature could explain why this relationship was found. Liu et al. (2012) reported a U-
shaped relation between ownership concentration and crisis-period performance. 
Considering that the ownership structure data used in this study refers to 2014 and since 
the ownership structure of a company remains stable over years (Zhou, 2001), results 
obtained by this study could be highly influenced by the impact of the recent economic 
crisis. Thus, it can be argued that changes in ownership structure do not only influence 




The ownership identity of the controlling shareholder proves to be an aspect to take into 
account when considering a firm’s ownership structure. State ownership is found to have 
a significant negative influence on Tobin’s Q. As expected by previous findings, state-
owned companies place excessive importance on non-profit goals, which results in low 
firm value (Goldeng et al., 2008; Dewenter & Malatesta, 1998). Likewise, this study 
documents a significant positive relation between corporate ownership and financial 
performance, which is in consonance with the findings of Pedersen and Thomsen (2003). 
This effect is verified since corporate ownership provides its allied companies with capital 
that can be used to foster growth (Connelly et al., 2010).  
As for the other types of owner identities, although pointing towards the same direction 
as hypothesized, they were not found to have a significant impact on the aforementioned 
relationship. This study found no effect of family ownership on firm performance, as has 
been reported by Jayaraman et al. (2000). The findings in terms of institutional investors 
are in line with that of Sundaramurthy et al. (2005) and Duggal and Millar (1999), who 
also found no significant relationship between institutional ownership and financial 
performance. Nevertheless, literature regarding institutional ownership suggests that 
there are two types of institutional investors, who have different interests and relations 
with the firm they invest in: pressure resistant and pressure sensitive (Kochhar & David, 
1996). Consequently, depending on the type of investor, managers could be influenced to 
focus on financial performance or to pursue goals that are not related to maximizing 
shareholder value. These opposing types of institutional investors could be an explanation 
for the insignificant relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance. 
This empirical research proposes R&D investment as a mediator of the relation between 
ownership structure and firm performance, acknowledging the importance of R&D 
activities for the performance of a company (Lee & O’Neill, 2003). The statistical 
evidence reveals that R&D investment negatively mediates the relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance, which means that firms with 
concentrated share ownership have lower R&D spending. Based on previous research, 
ownership concentration was expected to have a positive impact on R&D (Li Eng et al., 
2001; Barker & Mueller, 2002). Notwithstanding, the results of these studies focused on 
Anglo-Saxon economies, in which the main agency problem that arises from concentrated 
ownership is different than the one that occurs in Continental Europe. The present study 
provides support for the results obtained by Yafeh and Yosha (2003) and Munari et al. 
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(2006), who found that ownership concentration has a significantly negative impact on 
R&D investment in European countries. Subsequently, large shareholders may refute the 
positive effects of a higher equity stake in the firm by choosing to allocate the firm’s 
resources in a way that increases their personal wealth and avoids the creative self-
destruction of the company, thereby protecting the firm’s current capital (Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006; Morck et al., 2000). Interestingly, this mediation model also reveals a 
significant negative impact of R&D on firm performance. Several reasons might shed 
light on this finding. First, there are several ways to measure R&D investments, and the 
measurement used by this study might not be the most appropriate one. Second, it might 
be the case that the investments in R&D were not substantial enough to affect their firm 
performance. Third, previous scholars who explored this relationship have described 
inconsistent results. 
On the contrary, the results reveal that R&D investment does not mediate the relationship 
between owner identity and firm performance. However, the regression results of this 
mediation model revealed significant and positive coefficients for state and institutional 
ownership. Thus, this study argues that these two owner identities tend to encourage 
companies to be more innovative, which is in line with the findings of Aghion et al. (2013) 
and Munari et al. (2010). 
According to the literature, system effects influence the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance (Pedersen & Thomsen, 2003; Young et al., 2008). To 
further explore this stream of research, this study analyzes the efficiency of ownership 
concentration as a corporate governance mechanism across different Continental 
European regions. To increase the robustness of the findings, only Southern European 
and Northern European countries were compared, since these two regions have the most 
drastic differences in terms of the dominant law system. The results of this study 
demonstrate that ownership concentration contributes more towards firm performance in 
Southern European companies, where investors are barely protected by the law, than to 
Northern European companies, which are surrounded by a more effective legal 
framework. In fact, ownership concentration is found to diminish the performance of 
firms located in the north of Europe. Nevertheless, the interpretation of these regional 
differences might not be so straightforward. These results may also reflect variances in 
terms of country-specific culture, financial pressure, and institutional characteristics, as 




As mentioned previously, although the link between ownership structure and economic 
performance has been widely researched, scholars have achieved inconsistent and even 
contradictory evidence (Džanić, 2012; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Therefore, the 
present empirical research provides an important contribution to academia by further 
exploring this link using a unique dataset, with recent ownership data of European 
companies across several countries. By doing so, the research studies countries that had 
previously been disregarded by researchers and compares different institutional settings, 
as had been suggested by Wang and Shailer (2015). Furthermore, this study regards 
ownership structure as a multidimensional concept which involves ownership 
concentration and ownership identity, contrasting with previous papers that treat owners 
as a homogenous group. Moreover, this paper also provides an important methodological 
contribution. The present thesis is the first to consider R&D investment as a potential 
mediator of the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. 
The findings of this research have several implications for managers, providing evidence 
on what drives firm performance in Continental European companies. The results 
gathered suggest that firms benefit from avoiding intermediate degrees of ownership 
concentration and that the identity of the controlling owner is a crucial factor in predicting 
shareholder value. In fact, some types of shareholders have a more positive influence on 
firm performance than others. This investigation provides valuable insights that 
companies can keep in mind when analysing their ownership structures, allowing them 
to assess if the controlling shareholder of their firm fits their strategic goals. In other 
words, when deciding between different corporate strategies, management should 
consider the risk preferences, wealth constraints, and network relationships of their 
controlling owners to leverage their resources in support of the firm’s strategic 
development. This alignment of interests is particularly important considering the 
findings that suggest that R&D investment can assume the role of a mediator. 
Nevertheless, since institutional environments vary, there is no universal relationship 
between ownership structure and performance. This study finds that ownership 
concentration contributes more to firm performance in Southern Europe than in Northern 
Europe. Therefore, policy makers should assure that the legal and regulatory framework 




5.3 Limitations and Further Research 
Although the findings of the present research contribute to the understanding of how 
ownership structure influences firm performance, the results must be treated carefully, 
since they are subject to some limitations. These drawbacks should be reconsidered in 
future research. 
Firstly, the ordinary least squares (OLS) method was chosen to estimate the statistical 
models. Nevertheless, this method does not account for the possibility that ownership 
structure might be an endogenous variable. Following the research by Thomsen and 
Pedersen (2000) and McConnell and Servaes (1990), this study considers that ownership 
structure is an exogenous variable. Nevertheless, not only can ownership structure 
influence performance, but the contrary can also be true (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). 
Therefore, future research on the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance 
should test for the two-way relation, by implementing two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regressions in addition to OLS estimation. 
Secondly, due to data limitations, this research studies the effect of the independent 
variable upon a dependent variable at a given point in time. Consequently, the estimation 
results are based on cross-sections and do not provide robust conclusions regarding the 
direction of causality (Blumberg, 2014), being only able to establish a correlation between 
ownership structure and firm performance. Consequently, future studies should measure 
this relationship over time, using panel data, allowing the use of a fixed-effects model to 
control for unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
Thirdly, the results of this study demonstrate that there are significant differences in the 
effect of ownership structure between continental European regions. According to the 
literature, law and regulations is the main determinant of regional differences in 
ownership effects (La Porta et al., 2000). Nevertheless, factors such as the geographical 
position, industrial development, cultural characteristics, financial pressure, market 
competition can also impact the efficiency of ownership structure as a corporate 
governance mechanism. Hence, further research is required to investigate which factors 
lead to these differences and to the measure the impact of each of these items on firm 
performance. In addition, since this study only compares Southern European and 
Northern European companies, because these had the most contrasting legal systems, it 
would be intriguing to expand this comparison to the other Continental European regions.  
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Fourthly, this study used data from large companies, particularly listed companies with a 
market capitalization of $200M and more, due to the enormous difficulties in collecting 
data for small and medium-sized companies. Thus, large companies are overrepresented 
in empirical analysis (Hu & Izumida, 2008). Future research could examine if divergences 
in the effect of ownership on firm performance are attributable to difference in the size of 
firms. 
Finally, the measure of ownership concentration used in this sample may also limit the 
results of this study. Following the suggestion by Filatotchev and Wright (2011), this 
study relied on shares owned by the controlling owner as a proxy for ownership 
concentration. Nevertheless, some scholars suggest that it is important to investigate the 
relationships between the second, third and fourth owners (Ruiz-Mallorquí & Santana-
Martín, 2011), since it allows to account for the power of the largest owner relative to the 
next largest owners and understand eventual coalitions that may be formed by these. Thus, 
future studies should examine the five largest shareholders of the company instead of just 




















The goal of this thesis was to analyse whether and how corporate ownership structure 
influences the financial performance of Continental European listed companies. Since 
most previous studies on this topic focus on Anglo-Saxon countries, this research 
provides some valuable new insights for the corporate governance literature. 
Using a unique sample of 749 listed Continental European companies, with ownership 
data available for the year of 2014, this study reveals several important findings. First, 
there is a nonlinear U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. That is, low as well as high levels of ownership are those that lead to the 
highest Tobin’s Q. This finding does not support the principles of agency theory. Instead, 
these results are in line with previous studies which were performed in the context of the 
recent economic crisis. Second, corporate and state ownership have a positive and 
negative impact, respectively, on firm performance. This evidence suggests that the 
identity of the controlling shareholder influences the strategic goals of a company. Third, 
R&D investment negatively mediates the relationship between ownership concentration 
and performance. Therefore, a higher stake of the controlling shareholder will lead to a 
decrease in the financial resources allocated to R&D. Fourth, ownership concentration 
was found to be more important for countries characterized by less efficient legal systems. 
Overall, this empirical investigation demonstrates that ownership structure does 
effectively have an impact on the performance of a company. Consequently, it is 
important for managers and shareholders to assess the ownership structure of their 
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 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Eastern Europe 122 16,3 16,3 16,3 
Northern Europe 130 17,4 17,4 33,6 
Southern Europe 173 23,1 23,1 56,7 
Western Europe 324 43,3 43,3 100,0 
Total 749 100,0 100,0  
Table 13: Frequency Table of Region 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Corporate 208 27,8 27,8 27,8 
Family 273 36,4 36,4 64,2 
Institutional 152 20,3 20,3 84,5 
State 116 15,5 15,5 100,0 
Total 749 100,0 100,0  
Table 14: Frequency Table of Ownership Identity 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Construction 32 4,3 4,3 4,3 
Manufacturing 305 40,7 40,7 45,0 
Nonclassifiable 5 ,7 ,7 45,7 
Primary Sector 31 4,1 4,1 49,8 
Services 328 43,8 43,8 93,6 
Wholesale and Retail 48 6,4 6,4 100,0 
Total 749 100,0 100,0  
















 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Variables VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF 
Stake  8,421 1,000 1,011 1,000     
Stakesq  8,972        
Corporate  1,935    1,711 1,711 1,712 1,597 
Family  2,051    1,777 1,777 1,779 1,673 




1,088 1,321       1,255 
Leverage 1,078 1,102       1,041 
Eastern 1,685 1,941        
Southern 1,863 2,054        
Western 2,122 2,266        
Construction 1,081 1,109       1,122 
Primary Sector 1,105 1,134       1,204 
Retail and Wholesale 1,088 1,132       1,099 
Services 1,261 1,493       1,368 
R&D    1,011    1,020  
STAKENorth         2,932 
STAKESouth         2,949 
Table 16: Variance Inflation Factors 
Appendix IV 
 Durbin-Watson Modified White Test 
Model 1 1,868 0,146 
Model 2 1,901 0,115 
Model 3 1,779 0,052 
Model 4 1,819 0,243 
Model 5 1,741 0,267 
Model 6 1,888 0,055 
Model 7 1,794 0,275 
Model 8 1,793 0,314 
Model 9 1,749 0,693 












Figure 6: Scatterplot of Stake vs, lnTobin 
 
Appendix VI 




(Constant) -0,022 0 0,026 0,412 -0,07 0,028 
Stake 0,0014 -1,76E-05 0,001 0,016 0,000318 0,002465 
Table 18: Bootstrap for Coefficients (DV=lnTobin) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
